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The following is the Report of the General Reporter on the Law of Corporations presented
to the Annual Colloquium of the International Association of Legal Science (the 1995 MLS
Colloquium) which was held in Buenos Aires in September 1995. The theme of the conference
was "Towards a modern ius commune: converging trends in o changing world".
1 Introduction
My first impression, when asked to prepare a paper on convergence in corporations
law, was that there had been a significant degree of convergence internationally in the
general approach of states to corporations law, but rather less at a level of detail,1 This
paper explains that initial impression, asks why it might be true in a field of law which has
been the subject of few international treaties or harmonisation exercises, and explores some
core areas of corporations law to identify the trends which characterise the perceived
convergence.
Because my thesis is that the cause of convergence is primarily an improved
understanding of the economic significance of corporations laws, and the insight that brings
into the proper function of such laws, I begin by setting out briefly the purpose of
corporations laws in a modern economy.
2 Theunction ofcorporations law
The two principal features of the institution of the corporation in a market economy are:
• division of the ownership interest in an enterprise into a number of readily
transferable units - that is, shares;
* Barrister and Solicitor, Partner, Chapman Tripp Sheffield Young (Wellington, New Zealand).
1 For a general overview, see the discussion in the International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, vol XIII -
Business and Private Organisations, esp chs 3-6.
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• limited liability on the part of the owners who have invested funds in an enterprise.
They stand to lose the stake they have chosen to commit to the enterprise, but they do
not put their other assets at risk.
3 Division of ownership interest into shares
The fiction of legal personality enables a corporation to continue as owner and
operator of a business enterprise while investors come and go. The cost of transfers of the
enterprise's assets by the former group of investors to the new group is avoided. Instead, the
exiting investor simply sells shares to the new investor. The difference in cost is
particularly striking in the case of public listed corporations, where a call to a broker
replaces hours spent in lawyers' offices poring over agreements for the sale and purchase of
a business. But even in the case of closely held corporations, there are real savings in
transferring shares rather than the business assets.
A number of social benefits result from this reduced cost of transfer:
• obviously, reduced transaction costs are in themselves a benefit;
• the reduction in transaction costs enhances allocative efficiency. That is, if it costs
an investor less to move funds from one enterprise to another which promises better
returns, funds are more likely to flow from worse performing enterprises to better
performing enterprises, maximising the overall social benefit from the investments
made;
• the reduced transaction cost enables capital to be collected from a huge number of
investors to fund a single enterprise. Without a share structure, the co-ordination
and transfer costs of large groups of investors would inhibit the aggregation of large
sums to fund significant projects;
• the existence of readily tradable fungible units of ownership permits the development
of secondary markets, which in turn enhance the enterprise's performance incentives
by facilitating control changes, and reduce the enterprise's cost of capital;
• the existence of readily tradable fungible units of ownership also permits investors
to diversify their investments at little cost. This is a very important facility, since it
enables investors to spread risk across a number of enterprises, in a range of sectors.
Limited liability, discussed below, is another significant factor in permitting
diversification.
4 Limited liability
The other very important feature of corporations law is the limited liability of investors
in the corporation. A shareholder may lose the stake invested, but other assets are not at
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risk. Without this protection, very many projects with a positive net present value would
never be undertaken.
Of course incorporation is not the only route to limited liability for investors. In theory
it would be possible for each contract entered into by the manager of an enterprise to be
explicitly non-recourse: that is, the other party could look to the assets of the enterprise in
the event of non-performance, but would have no recourse against the manager and the
owners of the enterprise personally.2 But for most enterprises this sort of express
contracting is not practical: simply too many contracts are entered into on a daily basis, and
the cost of negotiating a non-recourse provision with every trade creditor is prohibitive.
What corporations law does is, in effect, provide a standard form non-recourse contract
which those dealing with the corporation enter into.3
The economic advancement of society, and especially industrial and technological
development, is heavily dependant on the taking of business risks. Provided the net present
value of a project is positive, it is (other things being equal) in the interest of society that the
project be undertaken. But if it has only a 10% chance of success, few people will be willing
to stake all their assets on it. More will be willing to stake a finite sum, and more still will
be willing to invest finite sums in a number of such projects, increasing the odds that the
payoff will be enjoyed by that investor.
Limited liability also makes the diversification of investments rational. If each new
enterprise to which an investor commits funds may result in a total loss of that investor's
assets, there is a strong incentive to invest in only one enterprise, or a small number of
enterprises, and monitor them very carefully indeed. But the low transaction costs of
investment achieved through shares, when coupled with limited liability, enable an investor
to spread risk among a number of enterprises of varying risk profiles.
Of course, if an enterprise makes a loss and the investors' liability is limited, someone
else must bear the loss. That someone else is the creditor of the corporation who goes
unpaid. But those dealing with corporations are also able to price for risk and, with a few
exceptions such as full-time employees, able to diversify their risk by dealing with a number
of corporations. So the risk of failure of a project is spread through creditors (who assume
it voluntarily and price to reflect it), and in turn through those who deal with the creditors.
Limited liability does not make risk disappear, but it is a technique for allocating it across
2 Provisions of this kind are common in major contracts entered into by trustees, in common law countries,
especially where the trust is borrowing substantial sums or buying or selling major assets.
3 In some cases, that non-recourse feature of the standard form contract will itself be reversed by a contract of
guarantee between the owners of the corporation and the creditor. But normally it is not.
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different groups of stakeholder on a voluntary basis, and thus across the community which
stands to benefit from the undertaking of the (risk-entailing) enterprises.
5 Risk-taking and risk-bearing are an integral part Of corporations law
It is important to bear in mind, when considering particular rules of corporations law,
that one of the justifications of corporations law is that corporations will take risks,
sometimes very substantial risks, and that if those risks do not come off the loss should be
borne by shareholders first (to the extent of their investment), but then by creditors. Any
attempt to prevent risk-taking, or to shift that remaining loss back onto the owners or
managers of the business, runs a serious risk of undermining the institution of corporations
law, and requires clear justification.
It is also important to bear in mind that investing in corporations, and dealing with
them, is a process which is both voluntary and dynamic. This is sometimes lost sight of
when the "plight" of small investors in large corporations is debated, or when creditors of
an insolvent corporation go unpaid. As Easterbrook has pointed out, the flaw in the Berle
and Means approach to corporate control is that people do not just wake up one morning to
find that they are managers, or investors.4 Investors choose to put their funds into
corporations in the belief that this will provide a better return than less risky investments:
where normal risks not caused by fraud or dishonesty come to pass, they have no legitimate
cause for complaint. Where small investors or creditors complain that they were unaware
of systemic risk, the first solution considered should be education about those risks, not an
attempt to reform the system to reduce risks at the cost of undermining its raison d'@tre and
introducing structural inefficiencies and unnecessary costs.5 Nor should losses suffered by
small investors prompt undue concern about the operation of the market.6 An attempt to
eliminate or even reduce risk in the securities market would be seriously misguided. And as
J K Galbraith has pointed out:7
4 See A Berle and G Means The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932); F H Easterbrook "Managers'
Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence" 9 Delaware J Corp Law 540 (1984).
5 In the case of publicly traded securities, ignorance of a small investor as to some of these risks is especially
irrelevant, since the expert participants in the market will factor these risks into their trading, which the market
price will reflect.
6 Even where large numbers of investors make significant losses, as was recently the case in New Zealand and
other countries in late 1987. Such events typically lead to calls for more regulation, with little analysis of the
true causes of the downturn and the associated losses. See J K Galbraith A Short History of Financial Euphoria:
Financial Genius is Before the Fall (Knoxville, Whittle Direct Books, 1990).
7 J K Galbraith, supra n 6, pp 78-80.
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Regulation outlawing financial incredulity or mass euphoria is not a practical possibility. If
applied generally to such human conditions, the result would be an impressive, perhaps
oppressive, and certainly ineffective body of law.
6 Some evidence of convergence
A Examples ofconvergence in corporations law
There have been almost no truly international harmonisation initiatives in the field of
core corporations law - by which I mean the law relating to the formation, internal
management and organisation and termination of corporate entities.8 There has been little
activity even in relation to more obviously trans-national issues such as securities markets,
the market for corporate control (takeovers, mergers etc) and cross-border corporate
insolvency.9
B Regional convergence
There are a number of regional groupings within each of which there has been
significant convergence in corporations law in the last ten years or so. One obvious
example is the European Union. The Treaty of Rome expressly contemplates harmonisation
of the corporations laws of member states and the establishment of co-ordinated
"safeguards...for the protection of the interests of members and others".10 A series of
Directives issued by the European Council has led to harmonisation of laws in areas
including disclosure of information concerning the corporation and its representatives,
financial reporting and audit, limits on ultra vires and constructive notice, allowing single
shareholder corporations, minimum capital for public corporations, and mergers and split-
11
ups.
8 There are two treaties on recognition of corporations, which address choice of law governing the internal
operation of corporations (but not the substantive rules themselves), neither of which have come into force:
Hague Convention Concerning Recognition of the Legal Personality of Foreign Companies (1951) reprinted in
1 Am J Comp L 277 (1952); EC Convention Relating to the Mutual Recognition of Companies and Legal
Persons (1968) reprinted at 2 Common Mkt Rep (CCH) 6255 (1981). For a brief discussion of these treaties,
and why they have not been widely taken up, see P John Kozyris "Corporate Wars and Choice of Law" [1985]
Duke Law Journal 1 at 53-55.
9 UNCITRAL is currently exploring the possibility of undertaking some work in the area of cross-border
insolvency. For a discussion of other initiatives in this area, see the paper presented to the 1995 IALS
colloquium by Professor Jacob S. Ziegel.
10 Treaty of Rome Art 54(3)(g), and see Alfred F Conard 'The European Alternative to Uniformity in Corporations
Laws" 89 Mich L Rev 2150 (1991) at 2152-5.
11 See LCB Gower, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law (5th ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1992) pp
60 - 66; Johan de Bruycker "EC Company Law - The European Company v. The European Economic Interest
Grouping and The Harmonization of the National Company Laws" 21 Georgia J Int & Comp L 191 (1991),
Conard, above n 10.
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This trend appears to have been slowed by the new emphasis in the EU on the principle
of subsidiarity, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, under which European intervention
is restricted to those issues which cannot equally satisfactorily be addressed by national
legislation. But the rush of new commercial laws in the post-socialist states of Europe has
led to a large number of corporations laws being modelled on the laws of EU states, in
particular Germany, which are geographically close to hand, share a common legal
tradition, and are a reliable source of expertise and advice.12
Another trade group which has harmonisation of corporations law as an explicit goal
is CARICOM, the Caribbean community common market.13 To give effect to this goal a
Working Party was established which reported in 1980 with a draft Bill. The work of the
working party, and subsequent work by the Caribbean Law Institute, has influenced
legislation in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica but has not brought about a high
degree of uniformity among the member nations, or indeed even among those implementing
reforms.
C Convergence in the United States ofAmerica
The most striking example of convergence - and one that I shall return to later, as it is the
best documented and most exhaustively analysed - is the convergence that has taken place
since the early years of this century between the corporations laws of the states of the
United States of America. Corporations law (as opposed to securities law or insolvency
law) is the preserve of the states, and is not the subject of Federal legislation. Yet there is an
extraordinary degree of similarity between the laws of the various states, and a change in
the law of one of the "leader states" - in particular Delaware - tends to be replicated
elsewhere. The principal cause of this convergence is said to be competition for
incorporations between states, led by Delaware. Another obvious force for convergence is
the American Bar Association's authoritative and hugely influential Model Business
Corporations Acts, the first of which appeared in 1950. Successive revisions have
introduced changes which have been widely, and relatively swiftly, adopted by states.14
12 For a discussion of the approach taken by a number of post-socialist states to commercial law reform,
including corporations law, see the fascinating paper by Cheryl W Gray and associates "Evolving Legal
Frameworks for Private Sector Development in Central and Eastern Europe" World Bank Discussion Paper 209
(1993). The desire to have laws which comply with the relevant EU directives, to facilitate membership at a
later date, has also been an incentive to follow existing EU models.
13 Established by the Treaty of the Caribbean Community Common Market (1973). Article 42(1) of the Annexe to
the Treaty requires the member states to work towards harmonisation of corporations law.
14 For a discussion of this phenomenon see William L Cary "Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware" 83 Yale LJ 663 (1974) and Douglas M Branson "Countertrends in Corporation Law: Model
Business Corporation Act Revision, British Company Law Reform, and Principles of Corporate Governance
and Structure" 68 Minnesota L Rev 53. These articles provide a useful summary of the trends that have
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D Divergence in the British Commonwealth
The convergence noted above needs to be weighed against a tendency to divergence, at
least at a level of detail, among British Commonwealth countries. A pattern of uncritical
adoption of the latest English Companies Act in most Commonwealth countries has changed
considerably in recent years: I discuss this further below.
7 What causes convergence in corporations law?
A Causes Of convergence in commercial law
In an illuminating essay on international harmonisation of commercial law, Professor
Roy Goode identifies at least nine methods by which laws are harmonised at an
international level:15
• a multilateral Convention without a Uniform Law as such;
• a multilateral Convention embodying a Uniform Law;
• a set of bilateral treaties;
• European Community legislation - typically a directive;
• a Model Law;
• a codification of custom and usage promulgated by an international non-
governmental organisation;
• international trade terms promulgated by such an organisation;
• model contracts and general contracfual conditions;
• restatements by scholars and other experts.
Apart from European Community legislation and other regional initiatives, and domestic
restatements (including draft legislation prepared by law reform bodies) none of these is
applicable to corporations law at an international level. It is interesting to inquire into the
occurred, although the interpretation offered has been compellingly criticised in eg Ralph K Winter, "State law,
Shareholder protection, and the Theory of the Corporation" 6 J Legal Stud 251 (1977); Daniel R Fischel 'The
Race to the Bottom' Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law" 76 Nw
Univ L Rev 913 (1982).
15 Roy Goode, "Reflections on the Harmonization of Commercial Law" in Cranston and Goode (eds) Commercial
and Consumer Law - National and International Dimensions (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993) at pp 6-7. Professor
Goode also notes that harmonisation can occur through colonisation (the foundation of the harmonising effect
of English legislation) or adoption by one state of another State's codes, but observes that these are not truly
international exercises with the objective of facilitating a common market or inter-State commerce, which is the
focus of his essay.
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reasons for this, and the other possible causes of the convergence I tentatively identify in
this paper.
B Case for hannonisation weak in core corporations law
The reason for the lack of attention given to international harmonisation of core
corporations law is not difficult to identify. As Professor Goode points out, the particular
characteristic of twentieth-century harmonisation lies in its motivation, which is to reduce
the impact of boundaries - and in particular, to reduce their significance in trade.16 But
trade by corporations is not (with a very few exceptions) affected by differences in the rules
which govern their internal operation: this is no more of an issue on the international scene
than it is domestically, where many corporations with quite different structures and
internal rules trade with each other quite unproblematically.17
This issue had to be considered by the New Zealand Law Commission in the course of
its recent company law reform project. New Zealand and Australia have entered into
ANZCERTA, a treaty aimed at fostering trade in goods and services in the region.18 There
is a memorandum of understanding between the Attorneys-General of the two countries
which seeks to harmonise business laws to give effect to the goals of ANZCERTA. The
Commission considered whether these international obligations affected the reform process
in New Zealand, and concluded they did not. As the Commission said, "much of company
law has little impact on trans-Tasman trade. Where it has, as for example in the law
relating to company insolvency, we have been particularly conscious of the ANZCERTA
implications." The New Zealand reforms bear little resemblance to current Australian
corporations law.19
The New Zealand Law Commission's comments highlight one of the areas of law relating
to corporations which does have significant cross-border implications: insolvency law.
Recognition of the legal personality of foreign corporations is another area with
international trade implications, which has been the subject of some international
16 Goode, above n 15.
17 It is interesting that the most obvious exception to this generalisation, the ultra vires doctrine (which can have
an effect on third parties dealing with a company, and so on trade), was the subject of the First European
Council Directive of 1968.
18 Australia and New Zealand Closer Economic Relations - Trade Agreement (1983).
19 See NZLC Report No 9 Company Law: Reform and Restatement (1989) paras 36-42, 145-153, 238. Other
reasons given for not following the Australian model were its unsatisfactory state, the complexity and difficulty
of its drafting, and the pending proposals for reform in Australia which made it an unstable model to say the
least. The New Zealand Commission suggested that its work might rather provide the basis for any trans-
Tasman harmonisation, an invitation that our larger neighbour has not yet taken up!
CONVERGENCE IN CORPORATIONS LAW 199
attention.20 Other areas are takeovers law, and securities laws generally: these directly
affect the existence of international trade in corporate securities, and the ease with which
investors in one country can invest in a corporation based in another.
Cross-border investment raises some interesting issues about harmonisation of
shareholder rights and obligations. It can be argued that harmonisation is desirable, so that
an investor in one country has a better idea of the package of rights incorporated in a
"share", and better knowledge of and access to enforcement mechanisms. This raises
questions of choice of law, as well as the issue of the non-standard content of corporations
laws. But the importance of these issues can easily be exaggerated.
First, most substantial cross-border investment is carried out by investors with access
to advice on the legal regime applicable in the corporation's home jurisdiction, and a
presence in the recipient country or a specialist knowledge of it. Smaller investors typically
invest in "foreign" corporations through a domestic stock exchange on which the foreign
corporation is listed: domestic stock exchange rules often go some way towards ensuring
that a share listed on that exchange carries similar core rights, whatever might be permitted
under the corporation's home law. Second, international capital markets display a
considerable tolerance for variation in non-financial rights attached to debt and equity
securities. Most investors see their remedy for dissatisfaction with management or the
affairs of the issuer generally as lying in liquidity of the securities and their ability to sell,
rather than in the exercise of enforcement rights. "Country risk", including any risks
associated with the legal regime of the country, is another risk which can be managed to
some extent by diversification. Third, and most importantly of all, if an issuer seeks to raise
funds in overseas jurisdictions it is in the issuer's interests to attach to its securities terms
which are as attractive as possible to investors: in practice this often means that certain
topics are addressed in a more or less standardised way. These standard terms need not be
imposed by the issuer's home jurisdiction: all that is required is a sufficiently flexible
corporations law which enables the issuer to customise the terms attaching to the securities
to meet the expectations of investors. That is, the default rules of the home jurisdiction are
not a barrier if the issuer is free to depart from them where it is commercially desirable to do
SO.
Perhaps the most critical issue for those concerned with cross-border investment is
removing artificial barriers to raising funds in a number of countries imposed by differing
(and often cumulative) disclosure and prospectus requirements in different countries.
Considerable work has been done on these issues in regional contexts such as the European
Community, and in Australasia. The thrust is normally to ensure that disclosure under one
regime is accepted in other countries, or need only be supplemented with a limited amount of
20 See above n 8.
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additional information, rather than being entirely recast. However I do not intend to
discuss this important topic in any detail in this paper, as such disclosure requirements
have little to do with core corporations law.
It is not easy to identify any factors apart from facilitating trade and international
capital raising and investment, which would justify devoting time and resources to
international harmonisation of core corporations law. These factors are not of themselves
sufficient, in my view. It follows that attempts to harmonise core corporations laws on an
international scale are likely to be of limited value, and the absence of such exercises need
not be lamented.
C Convergence through use of foreign models
The task of reviewing and redrafting a corporations statute is a huge one, requiring
substantial expertise and resources. This acts as a force for convergence, for it means that
all but the most insular or wealthy of countries tend to look overseas for models for reform.
These models are either adopted virtually intact, or used as a base for the reform exercise.
This tendency is reinforced by the frequency with which smaller or less wealthy countries
call on the expertise of consultants from countries whose laws and recent experience
appear to be relevant to the reform exercise: such consultants have a natural tendency to
take as their jumping off point the laws with which they are most familiar.
I have already mentioned convergence resulting from looking abroad for useful models in
the post-socialist economies, where the source has been the EU and in particular Germany.
For many years England was the leader in company law reform for its empire, and also
for independent members of the British Commonwealth. As England enacted new companies
legislation, the other Commonwealth countries would follow, usually without any
substantive review. This approach is summarised rather nicely in the Explanatory
Memorandum to the 1933 Bill introducing into New Zealand the English Companies Act
1929, with very minor format changes:
The Imperial Act on which this Bill is founded is not above criticism. For example, the Editors
in their preface to the eleventh edition of Buckley's Law and Practice under the Companies
Acts, make the following observations:...
This criticism might be taken to suggest that the Imperial model can be improved upon, and it
may further be suggested that if it can be improved upon it should be improved upon. But the
view taken by the Advisory Committee, and concurred in by the Government, is that we
should as far as possible adopt the verba ipsissima of the Imperial Act. Any attempt at
improvements in language or arrangement would in large measure defeat the ultimate
purpose of the Bill - namely that there should in this department of law be uniformity, as far
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as that is attainable, within the British Commonwealth, and that the decisions of the English
Courts should be applicable in New Zealand as they are in England.
If the criticisms of the Imperial Act, made in text-books, legal journals, and elsewhere, prove
to be well-founded and substantial, they will inevitably be followed by amending legislation in
England, and it will then be a simple matter for the New Zealand Legislature in its turn to
adopt those amendments. This view has the support of the responsible officials of the
Imperial Board of Trade, who administer the Imperial Act and with whom the proposals of
the Government in relation to the present Bill have been discussed. [Emphasis in the original]
However the influence of EC law on English law, and a view of English law reform in
this field as conservative to the point of ossification, and focused on detail rather than
underlying principle, has led many Commonwealth countries to look elsewhere for models
in the last ten to twenty years. The most influential of the various Commonwealth reform
exercises has been the Dickerson report in Canada in the early 1970s.21 This report, and
the accompanying draft legislation, has been the foundation of new or substantially revised
federal and provincial corporations statutes in Canada, and has been a major influence on
reform in the Caribbean and in New Zealand - and so, indirectly, in Argentina, Sri Lanka,
Papua New Guinea and other countries.
The Dickerson report is an example of the importance of restatements by law reform
bodies and scholars in the field of corporations law. Another influential restatement I
mentioned earlier is the Model Business Corporations Act. It is hard to imagine any law
reform body (in the common law world, at least) embarking on corporations law reform
without a careful scrutiny of these texts and of the ideas which they embody. Even where a
foreign model is not directly drawn on by those responsible for reform, restatements
prepared by reformers in other countries are often a source of ideas for change, and
challenges to "received wisdom".
D Competition for incorporations as a cause of convergence?
As discussed above, in the USA there has been striking convergence of state
corporations laws. This is attributed by commentators to competition between states for
incorporation and related business, led by Delaware. The reasons for Delaware's success
in attracting incorporations, and setting the agenda for corporate law reform, are said to be
the enabling or "facilitative" nature of its laws, the large and stable body of precedent
developed in the state, and the large and skilled corporate bar which enable corporations to
obtain a higher level of certainty and clearer, more authoritative advice on the transactions
21 Dickerson et al Proposalsfor a New Business Corporations Law for Canada (1971, Information Canada, Ottawa).
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which they contemplate.22 As Professor Roberta Romano points out in a recent article, this
competition is more complex than some commentators assume, as it is characterised by:
• significant transaction costs on reincorporation, which lead to limited
reincorporations except prior to major corporate transactions likely to be facilitated
by the move;
• a significant "first mover" advantage enjoyed by Delaware.23
But such competition, or a perceived risk of such competition on the part of lawyers and
legislators, is widely acknowledged to be a major force in convergence of US corporations
laws.
The question is whether similar competition is an effective force on a wider stage.
Certainly countries compete to attract businesses to establish a local presence, employ local
staff, export products and so enhance the domestic economy. In order to do so, countries
(especially developing countries) frequently establish special programmes to attract foreign
investors, involving tax breaks, easy transfer of funds and assets, and simplified
administrative and bureaucratic requirements. There is sometimes, though not always, a
review of domestic laws to which foreign investors will be subject, to see if these can be
streamlined, and costs and bureaucratic delays reduced. This process can embrace
corporations laws.
The desire to create an attractive climate for foreign investment certainly inclines many
countries towards adopting a legal framework for the establishment and operation of
corporations which will not appear unduly onerous or strange to foreign investors. An
argument often advanced on issues such as capital structures, and takeovers laws, is that
certain regimes familiar to investors, such as that of the United States, will be attractive to
investors precisely because they are well known internationally. There are often strong
counter-arguments, where the foreign model is flawed, or depends on institutional
arrangements which are not practical to replicate. But a desire not to be different for the
sake of it is certainly sensible.
22 For a discussion of the convergence in US corporations laws, and the debate over whether that tendency is to be
applauded or deplored, see Cary above n 14, Melvin A Eisenberg, "The Structure of Corporation Law" 89
Columbia Law Rev 1461 (1989), Easterbrook supra n 13, Fischel supra n 13, Winter above n 13, Ralph K
Winter, 'The Race for the Top Revisited: A comment on Eisenberg" 89 Columbia Law Rev 1526 (1989), Terence
L Blackburn, "The Unification of Corporate Laws: the United States, the European Community and the Race to
Laxity" 3 George Mason Independent Law Review 1 (1994), Lucien A Bebchuk, "Federalism and the
Corporation: the Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law" 105 Harvard Law Rev 1437
(1992), Roberta Romano "The state competition debate in corporate law" in LA Bebchuk (ed) Corporate Law and
Economic Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 1990), Easterbrook and Fischel The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law (Harvard University Press, 1991), chs 4-5.
23 Romano, above n 22.
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On balance, however, I do not believe that there is significant competition for
incorporations internationally, which has produced or is likely to produce convergence of
corporations laws.24
Competition for incorporations within the USA is made possible by the ability of a
corporation to carry on business and raise capital within that federation regardless of its
state of incorporation.25 That ability in turn is based on the constitutional protection
within the USA of interstate commerce, which effectively prohibits discrimination against
out of state corporations.
An environment which encourages competition for incorporations does not exist on an
international scale, for a number of reasons. First, there are many barriers to a corporation
formed in one country carrying on business in another.26 These are on occasion explicit, as
where foreign corporations cannot own land, or pay tax at different rates, or are subject to
limitations on access to the courts or to state contracts or licences of various kinds. They
may also be implicit, as where foreign corporations carrying on business in a country are
required to file financial statements and other forms of disclosure in that country in relation
to the whole of their business, in forms and subject to requirements peculiar to that country.
The cost of forming a local subsidiary will often be less, in such circumstances.
Second, the decision whether to trade in a particular country will be driven by a range
of commercial factors, of which only one is the cost of complying with legal requirements in
that country. In turn, only a small part of legal compliance costs arises from the cost of
complying with corporations laws. The decision on whether to form a corporation in a
country in which it is proposed to carry on business cannot be easily divorced from the
decision whether to carry on business in that country, and will almost never be a major
factor in the latter decision. Of the relevant legal issues, tax and employment law tend to be
far more significant.
Third, just as Delaware's institutional advantages have not proved easy to replicate in
other states, so too they are not easy for other countries to replicate. So this basis for
strong competition is lacking.
24 This is assumed to be true in the US literature on state competition: see for example Bebchuk above n 22, 1507-
1508, Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 22,233.
25 Blackburn, above n 22.
26 The Hague Convention on Recognition of Corporations, above n 8, has had little success, attracting only a
small handful of countries as signatories. Many countries impose some restrictions on foreign corporations,
going beyond mere disclosure to restrictions on participation in some forms of economic activity, higher tax
rates, higher registration fees etc.
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Fourth, although there are costs involved in transferring incorporation from one state in
the USA to another, it is legally possible. International transfers of incorporation are
sometimes not permitted by a country's laws, or restricted in various ways, and are likely to
be more expensive.27 Where the vast bulk of a corporation's owners are located in one
country, as is often the case, relocation offshore may also lead to a discount in share value
for risk (due to ignorance of the new legal environment, and increased information and
enforcement costs), which is likely to be unattractive to shareholders and managers.
Fifth, some countries apply a choice of law rule in relation to the law governing the
internal affairs of a corporation which focuses on the siage rdel of the corporation, not (as
under Anglophone law) its place of incorporation. So merely changing a place of
incorporation, a legal formality which is likely to cost less than moving a principal place of
business, would not be recognised by some countries as effecting a change in governing law.
The need to move a corporation's si&ge rdel in order to operate under a different
corporations law substantially enhances the transaction costs of such competition, making
it much less likely.28
E The influence of economic theory
The other cause of convergence in corporations law, in my experience, is an increasing
understanding by law reformers and governments of the function of corporations law in the
economy, and of the ends which it can and cannot serve.
Those responsible for the reform exercises I have been involved with in the last seven or
so years have for the most part proceeded along the following lines:
• corporations laws are seen as providing a form of business organisation which is
made up of a set of standard form contracts between the various participants
(owners, managers, creditors etc);
• the role of the state is essentially facilitative: it permits the formation of
corporations in the least expensive, most efficient manner possible, and provides a
27 For example, the Canadian legislation confers "appraisal" or 'buy-out" rights on dissenting shareholders of a
corporation which resolves to continue under the laws of another jurisdiction: this could impose a significant
cost on the corporation (see Canada Business Corporation Act s 188, Ontario Business Corporations Act s
181). In the UK there are significant taxation disincentives to migration of companies: Taxation of Chargeable
Gains Act 1992 (UK), s 185.
28 This appears to be the principal weakness in Blackburn's thesis (above n 17) that competition in corporations
law is more likely in the EU than in the USA, leading to an accelerated "race to laxity". Relocation of a siege
rdel seems unlikely simply in order to secure the benefits of a change in governing law. Similarly, the place of
establishment of the siege rdel of a newly formed European corporation is likely to be driven by cornmercial
considerations other than the legal environment for corporations. And on the increased importance of the law
of incorporation, even in continental Europe, see Kozyris above n 8 at 53-55.
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set of standard terms which can be varied by the participants to meet their particular
business needs. Greater reliance on markets to produce efficient outcomes, and less
confidence in the ability of governments to "pick winners" at the level of substantive
rules for the operation of the marketplace, has led to a withdrawal of prescriptive
law from many areas of corporate relationships;
• the imposition of procedural or formal requirements on corporations needs to be
considered very carefully, in the light of the need to facilitate business activity and
an awareness that information disclosure and regulatory compliance are not
costless;
• the imposition of substantive restrictions on the manner in which corporations are
organised, and the relationships between the participants, is difficult to justify and
should be rigorously scrutinised;
• the pursuit of collateral objectives through corporations laws (eg "shareholder
democracy", worker participation in management, diversified public involvement in
the sharemarket) is unlikely to be effective, and entails costs and distortions which
need to be justified by something more than warm fuzzy slogans.
One certainly sees these influences at work in the North American legislation, in the
proposed reforms in Argentina,29 and in the reforms in New Zealand and other
Commonwealth countries, to take a few examples. They can also be discerned in the lack of
progress or abandonment of some of the proposed EU directives, which appear to have
fallen victim to the subsidiarity principle precisely because there is no clear and
demonstrable case to be made that the suggested interventions will enhance trade or freedom
of establishment within the EU. The result is that individual countries, and within them
individual corporations, are left to decide how to address these issues subject to the
disciplines of the markets in which they operate.30
This theoretical framework encourages convergence towards a generally facilitative
model of corporations law, rather than towards identical "default" provisions. This may be
seen as a very low level of convergence. But it is the critical level for coherent reform, for
once the law in a country is facilitative it is possible for corporations which wish to depart
from the standard form to do so (at a cost). Corporations law then ceases to act as a
significant handicap to doing business from a base in one country, rather than another.
29 Proyecto de reformas a la ley de sociedades commerciales elaborado por la Comision designada por resolution
MJ 465/91 (Astrea, Buenos Aires, 1993). See the paper presented to the 1995 IALS colloquium by Professor
Daniel G Castro Viera.
30 This development is touched on by Blackburn, above n 22. See also Frank H Easterbrook, "Federalism and
European Business Law" 14 International Review of Law and Economics 125 (1994), esp 131-132.
206 (1996) 26 VUWLR
The precise content of the standard form provided in each country is much less
important, and continues to vary considerably. The goal of legislators, from a transaction
cost perspective, should be to provide the type of corporate constitution and associated
arrangements that the majority of corporations is likely to prefer, since that will reduce the
overall cost of departures from the standard form. But a reluctance to change the "default
settings" of the past, or a desire to ensure that participants consciously and deliberately
choose a lower level of protection in relation to certain corporate transactions, for
example, may lead to departures from this approach in some countries. Institutional factors
may also be relevant, as discussed below. While there is some convergence in this area of
corporations law, therefore, I believe it is weak, and likely to remain so.
F Tempering theory with institutional reality
One of the significant factors in deciding how to develop corporations law to suit a
particular country is the level of competence and resources of its institutions. A certain
level of institutional effectiveness is essential if there is to be a meaningful corporations
law: for example, there must be a functioning registry from which core information can be
obtained about the controllers and owners of the corporation, and about its legal location.
This is sometimes overlooked, with the result that a technically excellent and modern law is
almost entirely useless in the country which has adopted it.
The question of the appropriate body to carry out supervisory or investigatory
functions must also be tempered by reality in each country. The starting point should be to
avoid third party intervention in corporate affairs unless there is a genuine problem. But
where there is a breakdown of the normal arrangements, there must be ready access to
responsive authorities or tribunals with the necessary level of understanding of the issues
involved.
Two examples may be of interest. First, a belief on the part of those responsible for the
reforms in one jurisdiction where I have been working recently that the general courts have
insufficient expertise and are too slow to perform commercial dispute resolution functions
has led to the creation of a specialist tribunal to hear some disputes, and to replacement of
some provisions in the models used which required court intervention with a regime which
prescribes a "default" outcome in certain situations, with the ability to go to court or to a
tribunal only if that default outcome is not acceptable to a party. Second, when I was
drafting the Sri Lankan Companies Act, I included a requirement derived from English and
Australian models that any liquidator or receiver of a company must be an experienced
insolvency practitioner. The law reform body I was working with politely explained to me
that this was a wonderful provision in principle, but as there had never been a receivership
in Sri Lanka, and only a few liquidations (most conducted by one person, who had since
retired), there were no such persons in the country! The provision had to go.
CONVERGENCE IN CORPORATIONS LAW 207
8 Some likely directions for convergence
In the remainder of this paper, I consider three aspects of corporations law. I look at the
directions for convergence that my thesis suggests, and whether it is possible to discern
trends of the kind predicted.
A Capital raising, and distributions to shareholders
1 Capital maintenance
A feature of almost all common law countries' corporations law has until relatively
recently been the requirement that the company specify a nominal capital which it is entitled
to issue, and that each share issued have a nominal or par value. This is accompanied by
the "capital maintenance doctrine", developed by the courts and only partially set out in the
relevant legislation. The capital maintenance doctrine means in practice that:
• a share may be issued at par or at a premium over par. But it cannot be issued for
less than par without a special procedure being followed;
• a company cannot pay dividends to its shareholders unless those dividends are paid
out of current profits, or out of reserves. But the company need not make up losses of
capital in a previous year before it pays current profits out to shareholders as a
dividend;
• a company cannot buy its own shares, or return capital to shareholders, without a
special procedure to reduce its capital which involves a meeting of shareholders and
at least two applications to the Court;
• majority or super-majority shareholder approval is required to increase the
company's nominal capital.31
If requirements of this kind protect either shareholders or creditors of a corporation
from capital dissipation, they do so by chance rather than because they are well fashioned
tools for achieving this end. Professor Castro Viera puts it nicely, in describing the
principle of capital immutability as providing "a rough, unsophisticated kind of assurance
to the general public that the assets of the company exceeded its debts [by] the amount of
stated capital."32 If anything, he errs on the side of overstating the doctrine's value.
Shareholders are not protected from dilution of their stakes in the corporation by
restrictions on issue below par, if the company's shares have a market value above par.
31 The position was even more extreme in Argentina, as the paper presented to the 1995 IALS colloquium by
Professor Daniel G Castro Viera explains. A very rigid principle of "capital immutability" held sway.
32 Above n 31.
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This lack of meaningful protection is accentuated if the former North American stratagem of
issuing shares at low par values and high premiums as a matter of course is adopted. But
obtaining capital becomes more costly and difficult precisely when it is most likely to be
needed, ie when shareholder funds are depleted.
A creditor who extends credit to a corporation because it has a nominal capital of $1
million is being misled: it may not all be issued. A more sophisticated creditor who relies on
a corporation's issued, as opposed to nominal, capital may still find that it has all been lost
in previous years and that the expected capital cushion is not there.
In essence, the problem is that neither nominal capital nor issued capital has any
necessary relation with net shareholders' funds: it is the latter which is most relevant to the
credit risk involved in dealing with a corporation, as well as cashflow and an appropriate
risk-weighted assessment of contingencies over the period of credit.
The other problem with the argument that the classical capital maintenance doctrine
protects creditors is empirical. Creditors do not in fact go to the public registry and check
on a corporation's issued capital before extending credit. Ordinary trade creditors with
many customers do not normally carry out credit checks at all: the cost is not justified by the
amount of exposure to any one customer, and the risk of bad debts is factored into pricing to
all. Major creditors who do care about a corporation's creditworthiness do not rely on
searches at the public registry, and the limited historical information which those searches
produce. They get credit references, or bankers' opinions, or ask the corporation to provide
recent financial information and financial forecasts on which to base the assessment. They
may go to other sources of information such as credit rating agencies. They may take
security for the credit extended, or rely on retention of title clauses in contracts for the
supply of goods.
2 North American "stated capital" techniques
The approach used in some jurisdictions, such as Canada, replaces nominal capital with
"stated capital". Typical stated capital regimes provide that:
• the board of directors decides on the amount payable for shares upon issue;
• the corporation's stated capital is the amount actually received by the corporation
for its shares at the time they are issued;
• distributions may be made if the corporation will, after the distribution, be able to
meet its debts as they fall due and will have realisable assets in excess of liabilities
plus stated capital;
• a corporation may buy back its shares with board approval, and if it does so may
reduce its stated capital accordingly. In some jurisdictions voluntary buybacks by a
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corporation can only take place if a solvency test similar to that for distributions is
met. Other buybacks can still take place provided a bare solvency test (ie without
the requirement to preserve stated capital) is met;
• a corporation may issue some or all of its shares as redeemable shares, which the
holder can require the corporation to redeem, with a consequential automatic
reduction of stated capital;
• in some (but not all) jurisdictions, stated capital can be reduced by super-majority
resolution, with public notice of the reduction.
This approach avoids the difficulties posed by the capital maintenance doctrine in
relation to issue of shares, but is only marginally more focused on the real issues in relation
to preservation and adequacy of capital.
The stated capital system does not of itself confer any protection on shareholders.
Shareholders' funds may still be depleted by unsuccessful trading or depreciation, for
example. If the corporation's net assets fall below the stated capital, no distributions will
be permitted: but this is not a protection for shareholders, since they are if anything in a
better position where funds have been paid out to them as a distribution.
In any event, to the extent that the restriction is for the benefit of shareholders, it should
be able to be waived in the corporation's constitutional documents, or by unanimous
shareholder agreement.
For creditors, checking a corporation's stated capital would be as unenlightening as
checking issued capital is at present. Even if they do so, they would be none the wiser
unless they could also check:
• the current market value of the corporation's assets, which is not ascertainable from
the public register in most countries;
• the existence of securities over the corporation's property, which is often recorded
on a public register;
• how much is secured under any securities, and in particular under debentures, which
is not normally ascertainable from a public register;
• the amount of other unsecured liabilities, which again it is not normally possible to
discover from the public register.
It is true that stated capital provides a "cushion", in the sense that distributions which
would erode that capital are not permitted - and if such distributions are improperly made,
they can usually be recovered from the directors or shareholders. But a creditor who relies
on a particular stated capital may also find that it is eroded by trading losses, redemption of
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redeemable shares or buybacks pursuant to a minority buyout right. This may already have
happened before credit is extended, or may occur after the creditor has accepted the
exposure.
In addition, experience shows that in the case of closely held corporations in which the
shareholders and directors are identical, and all are involved in the operation of the
business, even the prohibition on distributions if stated capital cannot be preserved is
ineffective. The directors simply pay themselves salaries, rather than taking income through
distributions. This is normally quite lawful.
The practical result of these deficiencies in stated capital regimes is that creditors
normally either ignore stated capital, or contract to fill the gaps with additional notice
requirements and restrictions on use of funds when the cushion is eroded. Such contracts do
not depend on a statutory stated capital regime for their effectiveness, and can also be used
in countries such as New Zealand without such a regime.
For the reasons canvassed above, there is little to be gained from a stated capital regime.
There is a cost to corporations in complying with the requirement. If the cost is not justified,
why incur it?
3 Minimum capital requirements
In some jurisdictions, including Argentina, the EU countries, and some post-socialist
countries, certain classes of corporation are required to have a minimum nominal or stated
capital.33 There is nothing similar in most North American jurisdictions, New Zealand or
Australia.
It is impossible to specify in advance the amount of capital required to safely carry on
all types of business activity. To attempt to ensure businesses are adequately capitalised by
such a rough technique, which can only apply to domestic corporations rather than foreign
corporations, or even domestic individuals, partnerships or other forms of business
association is in my view bizarre. It is increasingly bizarre when one bears in mind that in
most countries, closely held corporations are not subject to any such requirement - and yet
there is no restriction on the type or scale of business that they can carry on.
This is an example of a well-meaning but poorly thought through requirement which is
of no real value to anyone. On the other hand, provided it does not apply to all
corporations, it is unlikely to be a significant barrier to efficient conduct of business. So
33 For the position in Argentina, see the paper presented by Professor Daniel G Castro Viera to the 1995 IALS
Colloquium. The EU requirement is set out in the Second Directive on Company Law, implemented in the UK
by ss 45 and 117-118 of the Companies Act 1985. For the position in selected post-socialist countries see Gray
and associates, above n 12.
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repeal of such provisions is desirable, but hardly urgent. If this kind of restriction applies
to all corporations in a country, however, and is set at a level which is meaningful enough
to prevent some businesses from being incorporated, there will be real costs and
inefficiencies, and some form of reform is more urgent. This can either take the form of
removing the requirement, or allowing formation of corporations of different kinds which
are not subject to the requirement.34
4 Capital - a summary
The above discussion of capital raising and distributions illustrates how applying
reasonably elementary economic analysis to corporate structures is likely to lead a
reformer towards abandonment of a strict capital maintenance doctrine, and to permitting
all or at least some forms of corporation to be formed and to carry on business without a
minimum capital requirement. Significant moves in this direction have indeed occurred in
numerous countries, including Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Argentina, and seem
likely to continue.
B Directors' duties to the corporation and its shareholders
Directors are appointed by shareholders to manage the company. In the case of very
small companies, they normally are the shareholders, or most of them. In the case of very
large companies, on the other hand, it is probably more accurate to say that the company is
managed under the supervision and general direction of the board of directors.5
At this point, it is worth reminding ourselves that the role of the business corporation is
to take business risks. So the job of directors is to manage or supervise the taking of
business risks. And it is also worth reminding ourselves of the truism that the board of a
company can only achieve above average performance by taking risks greater than those
associated with investing in sovereign debt, for example - if there were equally riskless
investments which provided a better return, demand for those investments would increase
until their price matched that of government paper. If investors want riskless returns, they
can buy government paper: they do not need to employ directors to do it for them. So they
are looking for a better return - that means risk, and means directors must take risks to do
their job.
Because corporations are very diverse, it is not easy for corporations law to specify
what is required of directors in detail. But certain general standards can be set: I consider
below what those might be.
34 The proposals for reform in Argentina have taken the latter direction: Castro Viera, above n 29.
35 Compare Model Business Corporations Act 8.01; Companies Act 1993 (NZ), s 128(1) and see Hilmer "Strictly
Boardroom - Improving Governance to Enhance Company Performance" (Information Australia, 1993).
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1 Limiting directors' duties
First, however, one important point should be noted. When an investor appoints an
agent to carry out any other form of business activity (ie other than to run a company in
which the investor has placed funds) it is entirely open to the investor and the agent to agree
between themselves on the appropriate level of performance and care to be expected of the
agent. In freely negotiated agency agreements, or in trust deeds appointing trustees to
manage funds, it is very common to find a wide range of limitations on the agent's or trustee's
liability, including provisions which:
• limit liability to recklessness or fraud, or to acts done in bad faith;
• expressly authorise the agent/trustee to act for others in the same market, or to
participate in the market on their own account;
• authorise the agent/trustee to take advantage of opportunities or information
acquired while acting as agent or trustee.
It is not usually considered appropriate for the law to limit arrangements of this kind -
except that exclusion of liability for fraud may be seen as contrary to public policy, and
invalid. Such arrangements may reduce the cost of the agency services obtained, or may
make it possible to retain the services of individuals who would not be prepared to act on
any other basis.36
It is difficult to see why the same reasoning should not apply to corporations and their
directors. Whatever the "default" standard of care established for directors, the law should
permit this to be varied by the corporation's constitutional documents: in large publicly
traded corporations, investors can make their own decision on whether or not this is
desirable and the market will price accordingly. In small corporations, each investor can
once again make his or her own decision about the acceptability of such a provision, and
either participate on those terms or not: but if a partnership can adopt such an arrangement,
for example, why not a corporation,37
36 This is particularly true in small countries such as New Zealand, where a limited number of skilled
intermediaries and agents means that exclusive relationships are often impractical.
37 Certainly there can be no complaint where a corporation is formed with such a provision in its constitution, or
where an investor invests after such a provision is adopted. But if such provisions can be adopted by a
majority vote, rather than unanimously, there may be investors in small corporations who have such a
provision thrust on them, and are unable to sell out easily as their investment is illiquid. The solution depends
on how major this change is perceived as being. If it is seen as relatively minor - the view I take - then no
special remedy is required: this is just one of a number of business decisions which the investor has agreed to
allow to be decided on a majority basis, such as appointment of any other agents of the company, or of a non-
director chief executive. If the change is seen as major, the appropriate solution is to allow investors who voted
against the change buy-out or "appraisal" rights.
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Interestingly, this is not yet a common position in corporations legislation. Most
countries take a view on the required standard, and provide for it to be invariable.38 The
first exception I am aware of was the Delaware law permitting a corporation's constitution
to limit director liability, which was enacted in 1986.39 A number of other states in the
USA have followed suit.40 If I had to pick an area of likely future convergence in
corporations law, I would see this as a significant change with strong economic
justifications, which is likely to spread.
2 The.Aduciary duties Of directors
Directors are the archetype of agents whose duties are difficult to specify in advance.
As scholars have pointed out, this makes it likely that the law will settle on the type of
general duties characterised as "fiduciary" ie duties to act honestly and in good faith, and in
what the director believes to be the interests of the corporation. These are indeed the types
of duty that one finds set out in many corporations laws.41 The author of the relevant
chapter of the International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law was able to make the
strong statement that:42
Directors owe duties of skill and care and fiduciary duties to the corporation. The standards
as to fiduciary duties may vary in detail from one jurisdiction to another, but the basic
approach seems to be pretty much the same everywhere.
3 The standard of care expected Of directors
The more difficult question in many ways is the standard of care expected of directors in
making business decisions. Should they be liable for losses suffered by the company if they
make decisions recklessly? Negligently? Or which are simply wrong? Most commentators
agree that where a board is reckless, in the sense that it makes a decision no reasonable
person could have made, it should be liable for the consequences. Similarly, most agree that
38 See the International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law, vol XIII ch 4 para 113, in which it is also suggested that
the trend is toward higher standards. I am not sure that this is as true today as it was at the time this work
was completed in the early 1970s.
3 9 Delaware Act of June 18, 1986, ch 289, 65 Del. Laws. For a discussion of this amendment to the Delaware
code see David S Schaffer "Delaware's Limit on Director Liability: How the Market for Incorporation Shapes
Corporate Law" 10 Harvard J Law & Public Policy 665 (1987).
40 Forty states as at 1 December 1994 (Model Business Corporations Act Annotated (3rd ed)).
41 For a discussion of the imposition of duties of loyalty, or "fiduciary" duties where it is impossible to specify
completely the parties' obligations see Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 22; Easterbrook and Fischel "Contract
and Fiduciary Duty" 36 J Law & Economics 425 (1993). For examples of legislation to this effect in relation to
directors see Companies Act 1993 (NZ) s 131; Canada Business Corporations Act s 102(1); Model Business
Corporations Act B 8.30(a)(1).
42 International Encyclopaedia of Comparative law vol XIII ch 4, para 113.
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it would be fundamentally inconsistent with the role of directors as takers of business risks
to impose liability for decisions which prove to be wrong: directors are not insurers of
every corporate project which is undertaken. But there is considerable debate over the
question of liability for negligence, and many different solutions have been propounded and
enacted. The passage from the International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law cited
above continues, a few lines later:43
The situation is different with regard to duties of care and skill. Here we find a great variety
of solutions. The standard liability ranges from slight negligence (West Germany) to gross
negligence amounting to fraud (England and, to a decreasing extent, the United States). In
some jurisdictions the test is objective, not taking into account the particular talents of the
individual director (West Germany), whereas in others the standard is wholly subjective
(England). Distinctions tend to be made between inside and outside (United States) or
salaried and non-salaried directors (France). Likewise, the scope for discretion given to
directors varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the broadest scope probably being granted by
the American "business judgment rule". Occasionally members of management may even
become personally liable for corporate debts in case of any mismanagement (France).
C The New Zealand approach
In New Zealand, section 137 of the Companies Act 1993 provides:
A director of a company, when exercising powers or performing duties as a director, must
exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonable director would exercise in the same
circumstances taking into account, but without limitation,-
(a) the nature of the company; and
(b) the nature of the decision; and
(c) the position of the director and the nature of the responsibilities undertaken by him or
her.
This is a largely objective standard, in which the performance of a director in particular
circumstances falls to be assessed by reference to the standards of an abstract "reasonable
director" - itself a concept which it is not entirely easy to pin down, 6specially outside the
context of large listed companies with professional directors.
43 Above n 42.
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D The Delaware approach
The law of Delaware, and many other states of the USA, addresses this issue by
reference to the'business judgment rule", summarised in one text as follows: 44
A decision by a board of directors (i) in which the directors possess no direct or indirect
personal interest, (ii) which is made (a) with reasonable awareness of all reasonably available
material information, and (b) after prudent consideration of the alternatives, and (iii) which is
in good faith furtherance of a rational corporate purpose, will not be interfered with by the
courts, either prospectively by injunction, or retrospectively by imposition of liability for
damages upon the directors, even if the decision appears to have been unwise or have caused
loss to the corporation or its stockholders.
Rather than placing directorial decisions beyond judicial scrutiny, the business judgment
rule is in reality a black-letter formulation of the factual and legal issues to be reviewed in
determining whether judicial interference with a directorial decision is warranted. Only
after the court has concluded - depending upon the circumstances, from either a failure of a
challenger to prove otherwise or an affirmative showing by the directors of appropriate
disinterest and care - that all the prerequisites for judicial non-interference have been met
does the inquiry terminate. On the other hand, if evidence discloses that one or more of the
elements underlying application of the business judgment rule is missing - viz, there has been
self-dealing, failure to exercise the requisite degree of care, or an irrationality of purpose -
other judicial rules come into play to determine whether and to what extent the court will
employ its injunctive powers or impose personal liability upon the directors."
The "requisite degree of care" referred to is described in most recent Delaware court
decisions as requiring directors to act without "gross negligence". But the difference
between gross negligence and simple negligence is not clear, and in the view of many
commentators has been eroded by recent decisions.45
E The position in Argentina
The objective approach to director liability in Argentina, as described by Professor
Castro Viera, is one of the strictest I am aware of.46 I am not surprised by his observation
that able individuals may be reluctant to accept appointment as external directors under
44 Drexler, Black & Sparks Delaware Corporation Law and Practice (Matthew Bender, 1995) 15.03.
45 Such as Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A 2d (1985), Cede & Co v Technicolor Inc 634 A 2d 345 (1993).
4 6 Castro Viera, above n 29. Note however the strict liability of directors for company defaults in Japan, as
described in M Tatsuta "Risks of Being an Ostensible Director" 8 J Comparative Business and Capital Market
Law 445 (1986).
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such a regime, where an individual director may be liable for a board decision without any
personal negligence, let alone the protection of a higher standard of fault.
F Directions for the future?
There is nothing easier than re-evaluation of a risk with the benefit of hindsight. If
director decisions are to be reviewable on objective grounds, it seems to me that there is a
real risk that directors will be more risk averse than it is in the interests of investors, or the
economy, for them to be. It is always safer not to make a speculative investment than it is to
make it. The many executives who turned down the opportunity to acquire the right to
manufacture plain paper copiers were not by any standard negligent. But the decision cost
the companies' investors a fortune. If a board elected by shareholders believes in good faith
that a project is viable, it seems to me that the risk should be taken without fear of a
subsequent expensive second-guessing exercise on the part of risk-averse professionals and
judges who can examine the decision at leisure over a period much longer than that which
was available to the board to make it.
My own thinking on this difficult point is still evolving. But I am very nervous indeed
about the extent to which the current New Zealand legislation imposes an objective
standard on directors. I believe it is more likely to cause systematic risk aversion and
underperformance in New Zealand business than to protect investors. And even if it does
protect investors, it may be protecting them from the very thing for which they invest in
equities. A prudent and diversified investor neither wants nor needs protection from risk in
individual ventures. A standard of recklessness, perhaps coupled with "gross negligence"
(though I am not sure I know what that means, either) seems more appropriate.47 I should
emphasise, however, that I would be much less troubled about the precise standard of care
adopted in a jurisdiction which allowed the corporate constitution to limit or modify
director liability, as discussed above.
It will be interesting to see whether there is significant convergence towards any one
standard for assessing the level of care expected of directors. My suspicion is that this is
unlikely, since allowing director liability to be limited in the corporate constitution - a
trend that is likely to spread - enables each corporation to set the standard it requires,
reducing the importance of the "default" provision.
G Fundamental changes to corporate structure or corporate activities
The thesis that convergence is driven primarily by a focus on economic efficiency
suggests that there might be a trend in modern corporations statutes to increase the power of
47 This is the standard applied by the Delaware courts, as discussed above. It is also the standard applied by the
English courts, and in New Zealand (in a somewhat diluted form) prior to enactment of the 1993 legislation.
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the majority to determine the use to which the corporation's funds will be put, while
conferring on minorities opposed to a fundamental change an appraisal remedy or'buy-out
right". The ability of a minority to prevent majority-approved transactions would be
reduced, as would the need for judicial or bureaucratic approval of such matters.
It is difficult to see why a majority should ever be prevented from using its investment in
the manner it thinks fit, provided change is decided on consistently with the corporate
contract. Shareholders are investors in a business. In large corporations, the directors
decide how the business is to be run. Major transactions, however, are normally decided on
by shareholder vote. In smaller corporations, the shareholders usually are the directors,
and they decide all matters. If the relevant controllers - the board appointed by
shareholders, or the majority - are dissatisfied with the way a business is run, or wish to
redeploy the assets of the enterprise in a new project, it is difficult to see how it can be
efficient to restrain them from doing so.
If majority investors run the risk of being prevented from reorganising a business:
• existing shareholders are less likely to spend time and money exploring methods of
improving the company's performance, where minority shareholders may not support
the change or may demand a disproportionate payment as the price of their support;
• new investors who believe a company's assets are underutilised are less likely to
enter the market for control of that company, to the detriment of would-be sellers and
at the cost of reduced incentives for all managers.
These problems are aggravated if there is also a risk that the majority will be unable to
sell because the market is insufficiently liquid: this is a common difficulty in the case of
closely held and mid-sized corporations. The cost of funds for corporations generally is
likely to increase as a result of such risks.
On the other hand, if a change in company direction is so great that it cannot fairly be
said to have been within the contemplation of the minority investors at the time they bought
into the company, they should not be forced to accept the change in rules part way through
thegame.
It follows that injunctive relief is unlikely to be appropriate to prevent majority-
approved action. Nor would damages be an appropriate remedy, since this would give the
minority an incentive to wait to see how the majority's plans turned out, accept them if they
went well, and sue for compensation otherwise. If a majority is to have the right incentives
to use corporate assets in the most productive way possible, meaning by that the project
with the highest net present value, the minority cannot be permitted to take a risk-free ride
on the majority's coat-tails.
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The appropriate remedy for the disaffected minority seems to be an immediate election to
exit at a fair price which does not take into account the decision of the majority, for better
or worse. Dissolution of the company would achieve a similar freedom for the majority to
use its assets as it thinks fit, and cashing out for the minority, but at a much higher cost to all
concerned. Dissolution seems to be a sensible remedy only if the company or the majority is
not able to meet the cost of simply buying out the minority.
As well as meeting any "fair treatment" concerns in relation to minorities in
circumstances of this kind, there are persuasive arguments that the appraisal remedy plays
an important role ex ante in ensuring that control transactions increase value.48
The economic rationale for providing an appraisal or buy-out remedy is strong, and its
spread has been significant. In 1968 the author of the International Encyclopaedia of
Comparative Law noted (with approval) the existence of the remedy in Argentina, Italy and
the US, and in some limited circumstances in England and Germany.49 His comment that "it
seems to be growing in influence" has proved accurate: these countries have since been
joined by many others including Canada, New Zealand, other countries which have
followed the Canadian model, Poland, and other East European countries. The trend seems
likely to continue.
9 Final comments
In this paper I have sought to identify elements of a trend I perceive towards a more
facilitative model for core corporations law. Although details of corporations laws differ
substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the direction of reform appears somewhat
similar. This can be attributed to a number of factors, but principally to:
• a greater focus by those responsible for reform in this area on the common economic
goals served by corporations law in all countries. An understanding of the economic
purpose of corporations law sheds considerable light on some longstanding
assumptions in this field;
• the influence of reforms in other countries, and restatements by scholars and law
reform bodies. Much of this scholarship itself embodies a more rigorous and
economically coherent approach to corporations law, reinforcing the first factor
mentioned above.
The movement towards a facilitative model of corporations law is, as the second point
illustrates, a self-reinforcing process which can be expected to become even more
widespread and rapid in years to come.
48 Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 22, ch 6.
49 Above n 42, Vol XIII ch 6 paras 4, 106-111.
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Vers une harmonisation possible des conceptions du droit des socims : Analyse
des points de convergence.
Dans un domaine du droit qui n'a que rarement fait l'objet de conventions
internationales, et en postulant ndanmoins l'existence effective d'une tendance h
l'harmonisation des regles relatives aux droit des socidtes dans chaque droit national pour
tenir compte des nouvelles donnes du commerce mondial, l'auteur s'attache h ddmontrer que
l'explication du phenom&ne rdside h la fois dans la prise en compte de la place maintenant
ddvolue h 1'6conomie dans le droit des socidt6 d'une part, et dans la redefinition des
fonctions conf6rdes h ces r&gles d'autre part.
Si l'on ne consid@re que les seuls fondements actuel du droit des socidtds, deux
caractdristiques fondamentales apparaissent: le fractionnement de la propridt6 du capital
dans des actions ou parts sociales, et ensuite la limitation de la responsabilit@ des
propri6taires du capital social de telle sorte que leurs capitaux ne sont que partiellement
affect6s. Sur ce dernier point, il est important de se rappeler que la notion de risque et sa
prise en charge font partie int@grante des fondements du droit des sociatds, de telle sorte que
toutes tentatives tendant h emp@cher cette prise de risques ne seraient pas sans cons6quences
ndfastes sur l'institution du droit des sociatds.
A ddfaut de vdritable cooptration internationale dans le domaine du droit des sociatas,
on s'aper,oit cependant que depuis une dizaine d'ann6es, quelques initiatives ont 6td prises
A une dchelle rdgionale. Bien entendu, le meilleur exemple, reste le rappel des dispositions du
Traitd de Rome ainsi que des diverses directives qui l'on suivies et qui toutes ensemble se
r@clament ouvertement d'une volont@ d'harmonisation des r*gles rdgissant le droit des
socidtds des pays membres de la CEE.
Deux autres exemples, mdritent attention. Tout d'abord la r@glementation du CARICOM
relative au marchd commun des pays de la zone caraibe. Ensuite, et plus symptomatique des
tendances actuelles dans ce domaine du droit, toute la 16gislation nord amdricaine qui d'un
dtat fed@ral A l'autre tend maintenant h @tre uniforme, suivant en cela les ragles pr6conis6es
par l'Eat du Delaware dont l'influence s'est faite ressentir sur l'ensemble des Etats Unis
d'Amdrique.
Par contraste, les pays du Commonwealth britannique dchappent h cette logique. Ainsi
bien que la New Zealand Law Commission ait relevd que des pans entiers de la 16gislation
des societ@s avaient des implications internationales (en matiere de faillite, ou encore
d'investissements internationaux notamment), elle a cependant indiqu@ que cela ne voulait
pas pour autant dire que le besoin d'harmonisation soit absolument ndcessaire. Des lors
que les r*gles de fonctionnement des sociatds commerciales sont sans rdelle influence sur les
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opdrations commerciales qu'elles r@alisent entre elles, le besoin d'une harmonisation au plan
internationale ne se fait gulre sentir.
Reste toutefois que des raisons objectives militent pour la prise en compte d'une
harmonisation. Si l'exemple amdricain semble conforter cette analyse, il ne faut pas
n@anmoins en tirer de consdquences trop g6ndrales.
En effet l'absence de v@ritable comp@tition sur le plan international pour attirer
l'immatriculation des sociatds commerciales dans un pays plut6t qu'un autre, limite
singuli*rement la portde de l'exp@rience amdricaine.
Une autre explication de l'harmonisation des diff6rentes regles du droit des socidtds,
tient h la prise en compte par le 16gislateur des fonctions remplies par les socittas
commerciales dans 1'6conomie d'un pays donnd.
Ceci 6tant, plusieurs domaines particuliers du droit des soci6tds peut @tre affectd par
cette ndcessaire harmonisation des ragles sur le plan international. On citera notamment la
formation du capital de la soci6td, les r@gles actuelles dans les pays de Common Law ne sont
pas aussi protectrices que l'apparence voudraient le laisser croire et un investisseur
dtranger pourrait @tre induit en erreur. Une harmonisation avec les 16gislations plus
protectrices aux investisseurs doit donc @tre envisag6e. Les r&gles de distribution des
dividendes, tout comme celles relatives aux organes dirigeants de la socidtd et leur
responsabilitd doivent aussi faire l'objet d'une harmonisation internationale.
Le succ&s de toutes reformes d'ensemble entreprises dans ce domaine, repose sur la prise
en considdration deux facteurs fondamentaux:
Le premier d'entre eux est la prise de conscience par le 16gislateur que les socittas
commerciales obdissent au dela des frontiares h des objectifs communs. Il s'agira ici
d'intdgrer le concept de culture des entreprises multinationales dans le droit.
Le second facteur, rel@ve plus de l'ouverture d'esprit ndcessaire pour entreprendre de
telles reformes. En effet ne devront pas @tre n6glig@es les exp@riences similaires d*
entreprises dans d'autres pays, ainsi que les analyses critiques qui en sont faites par la
doctrine.
